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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 08-1538
                              
SOEW GING TIE; PETER SETYO PURWANTO; YUWONO TIO,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
Respondent
                              
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency Nos. A97-976-214, A70-868-768, A96-204-312)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable R.K. Malloy
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 13, 2009
Before: AMBRO, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 27, 2009)
                              
OPINION
                              
PER CURIAM
Soew Ging Tie, Peter Setyo Purwanto and Yuwono Tio, all Indonesian natives and
citizens, petition for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
      Petitioners withdrew their claims under the Convention Against Torture before the IJ1
ruled on their other claims.
2
(“BIA”), affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum
and withholding of removal.  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition. 
Tie, the lead petitioner, and her son, Purwanto, arrived in the United States in 2003
and her husband, Tio, entered in 2000.  The Department of Homeland Security charged
all three petitioners with removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).  Petitioners
conceded removal but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the Convention Against Torture. In her asylum application, Tie averred that she feared
returning to Indonesia because, as a Chinese Christian, she feared harm from Indonesian
Muslims.  Before the IJ, she testified that “horrific incidents” occurred to her relatives in
Indonesia.  (App. at 108-09.)  Petitioners also submitted, among other documents, the
2002 and 2005 State Department Country Reports for Indonesia, and affidavits from Dr.
Jeffrey Winters and Jana Mason describing the persecution Chinese Christians
historically faced and currently face in Indonesia.  (App. at 188-208.)  
The IJ, finding Tie’s testimony credible, denied the petitions for asylum and
withholding of removal.   Specifically, the IJ found that the petitioners admitted that they1
had not suffered past persecution and failed to show that they would suffer future
persecution based on any of the statutorily protected grounds.  The BIA adopted and
affirmed the IJ’s decision.  In its January 30, 2008  per curiam opinion, the BIA found
3that petitioners failed to show a pattern or practice of persecution in Indonesia against
Chinese Christians and rejected petitioners’ argument that the IJ failed to consider the two
expert affidavits they submitted.  (App. at 2-3.)         
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We uphold the BIA’s
determinations if they are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on
the record considered as a whole.  Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir.
2008).  Under the substantial evidence standard, the BIA’s determinations “must be
upheld unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” 
Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992)).  Where the BIA substantially adopts the findings of the IJ,
we review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA.  He Chun Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d
215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).   
To be granted asylum, petitioners must show that they are “unable or unwilling to
return to [Indonesia] . . . because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A).  To be eligible
for withholding of removal, petitioners must demonstrate that “there is a greater-than-
fifty-percent chance of persecution” in Indonesia based on one of these protected
grounds.  Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(C).
4Petitioners argue that the BIA did not make a meaningful review of the
administrative record and thus violated their due process rights.  Specifically, petitioners
argue that the BIA did not make an individualized determination of their case.  See
Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 2001) (“the question for due process
purposes is . . . whether the [BIA] made an individualized determination of [the
petitioner’s] interests.”).  A review of the BIA’s opinion reveals that this claim is without
merit.  The BIA cited to the expert witness and country condition evidence petitioners
submitted and noted that petitioners had family remaining in Indonesia.  Thus the BIA’s
decision contains “more than sufficient indicia that it undertook an individualized
determination.”  Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 212 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  
Similarly, to the extent that the petitioners argue that the IJ failed to consider their
expert witness evidence, that claim is also without merit.  While the IJ did not discuss the
evidence in depth, it cited the affidavits in its opinion.  See Myat Thu v. Att’y Gen., 510
F.3d 405, 416 n.16 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Consideration of all evidence does not require
comment on all evidence.”).  Both affidavits extensively discussed historical
discrimination against Christians and the ethnic Chinese population.  The IJ, in her
opinion, noted that there were problems in Indonesia, including historically
discriminatory practices towards the ethnic Chinese population.  (App. at 50A.)  Thus
petitioners have failed to meet their burden of proof on this claim.  See Kamara, 420 F.3d
5at 212 (it is petitioner’s burden to show that the agency did not review the record when it
considered the appeal).
We also find that substantial evidence supports the BIA and IJ’s findings that
petitioners failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.  In order to
established a well-founded fear of future persecution, petitioners were required to show a
subjective and objective fear of persecution.   Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir.
2005).  To demonstrate an objective fear, petitioners were required to show that they
would be singled out for persecution or demonstrate that “there is a pattern or practice” of
persecution of Chinese Christians in Indonesia.  Id.  We have held that in order to
constitute a “pattern or practice,” the persecution of a group must be “systemic, pervasive,
or organized.”  Id. at 537.     
Petitioners argue that they submitted evidence which shows a pattern and practice
of persecution against ethnic Chinese and Christian citizens in Indonesia.  Petitioners
point to the 2005 State Department Country Report and their expert witness testimony as
evidence of such a pattern and practice.  We have held, however, that the 2003 and 2004
Country Reports for Indonesia do not demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution. 
Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).  To the contrary, the reports
indicate that the Indonesian government has taken steps to promote religious and ethnic
tolerance and “that private parties, not government officials, are the predominant cause of
harassment and violence.”  Id. at 233-34.  We have also noted that the 2005 Country
6Report, the same report petitioners rely on in this case, documents “similar or improved
treatment of Chinese Christians in Indonesia.”  Id. at 234.  Petitioners’ citations to
isolated incidents involving Christians in the 2005 Report do not compel a finding that the
BIA’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.  See Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334
F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2003) (Just because “the State Department report cuts both ways . .
. does not mean that it does not constitute substantial evidence.”).  Further, while the
petitioners’ expert witness affidavits counter more recent country reports on Indonesia,
the BIA did not err in relying on the more recent reports over the affidavits.  See Zubeda
v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 477-78 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Country reports . . . are the most
appropriate and perhaps the best resource for information on political situations in foreign
nations.”)
Finally, because petitioners cannot satisfy the standard for asylum, they cannot
satisfy the higher burden of proof for withholding of removal.  Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d
46, 47 (3d Cir. 1991). 
